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Introduction
Cash dividends represent circa 34% of earnings globally (Faccio et al., 2001 ) and recent studies have shown a substantial variation of dividend ratios internationally, both among developed (Denis and Osobov, 2008) and emerging markets (Goyal and Muckley, 2013; Mitton, 2004) . There is, nevertheless, a relative dearth of research concerning payout policies in emerging markets such as those in Latin America. 1 An exception is that of Benavides et al. (2016) , who show that Latin American firms' smooth dividends more in relatively well governed countries in the region, and that these firms show evidence of adhering to the pecking order and trade-off theories. Also, Boulton et al. (2012) indicate a catering explanation for Brazilian firm preferences to pay cash dividends rather than interest on equity, despite tax incentives to the contrary. In this paper, we establish the comparative flexibility of payout policies in Latin America, and in so doing highlight an intriguing open question in the dividend policy literature.
We report, year-by-year, from 1994 to 2014, the proportion of firms in Latin America which initiate (omit), markedly increase (decrease) their cash dividend payouts as well as the proportion of payers which pay in consecutive years or exhibits a stable dividend policy. The results suggest that Latin American firms show marked flexibility in their dividend policies.
For instance, 8 percent of Latin American firms omit dividend payments each year on average. In contrast, in the United States only about one percent of firms omit each year (Skinner, 2008) , while in international data Twu (2010) reports a figure of approximately 4.5 percent. Moreover, more than 26 percent of Latin American firms increase their dividends by at least 30 percent each year while nearly 20 percent reduce dividends by this amount. These 1 Some studies, however, do include Latin American countries, but do not exclusively focus on them. LaPorta et al. (2000) examine agency "outcome" and "substitution" models of cash dividends in Argentina and Mexico in 1994. Chay and Suh (2009) consider the cross-sectional determination of payout policies, in particular the importance of cash flow uncertainty, with regard to small samples of firms in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.
are far larger figures than reported, for instance in, Denis and Osobov (2008) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the measurement of the broad concept of corporate payout flexibility. In section 3, we report our sample and variables. In section 4, we present the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Payout policy flexibility and hypotheses development
To quantify the concept of payout flexibility we, initially, study the proportion of firms in Latin America which initiate (omit), markedly increase (decrease) their cash dividend payouts as well as the proportion of payers which pay in consecutive years and the proportion with a stable dividend policy.
Then, we turn to the Lintner equation (1956) DIVt = α0 + α1.NIt + α2.DIVt-1 + εt (1) where DIVt is the level of cash dividends at time t, NIt is the net income at time t, and εt is the error term. Due to the lagged dividend variable, we avoid a Nickell (1981) bias, and estimate the coefficients with Arellano-Bover (1995) Blundell-Bond (1998) dynamic panel specification. α1 is the sensitivity to earnings and (1-α2) is the speed of adjustment (SOA).
The target payout ratio (TPOR) is α2/ (1-α1). Lambrecht and Myers (2012) show that α2 depends on β (the market discount factor = 1/(1+r) , where r is the risk free rate) and on habit formation, h, by the managers: α2 = β*h.
Thus, habit formation is defined h = (1+r)*α2 (2) Lambrecht and Myers (2012, equation 47) elaborate to show that habit formation can also be calculated, if managers have a negative exponential utility function, as γ1 in this first differences in dividends equation:
The combination of the Lintner equation (1) and the habit formation equation (2) America may indicate the importance of cash dividend signaling in the region.
Data and variable construction
We test our flexibility related hypotheses with firm-specific data on 757 listed firms (up to 7,876 firm-years) on exchanges (and headquartered) in seven Latin American countries In line with the corporate payout determination literature (e.g. Fama and French, 2001 , Denis and Osobov, 2008 and Skinner 2008 , our sample excludes foreign firms, ADRs, firms with negative dividends or market-to-book ratios, and firms which operate in the financial services (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949) sectors. We search the Worldscope database for active as well as dead and suspended listings in order to avoid survivor bias, and select companies with usable ISIN and SIC industry codes. We eliminate companies with similar ISIN codes and similar names, and companies that give error codes in downloading data. Finally, we adopt the country specific CPIs to convert the nominal firm specific accounting and financial data into real 1994 prices and then convert it to a common U.S. dollar numeraire using the year-end country-specific exchange rate.
Winsorization is undertaken at the upper and lower 1 percent level. The panel also shows the proportions of these firms which are prior payers (i.e. pay dividend over two consecutive fiscal years), which conduct cash dividend initiations and abandonments, which either increase or decrease the cash dividend payout by more than 30 percent compared to the previous year's cash dividend payout (Chemmanur et al. 2010) , and which are stable payers i.e. neither initiate nor abandon or substantially increase / decrease their dividend payout amount from the previous fiscal year.
Empirical results
In comparison with firms in the United States (Skinner, 2008) and in international markets (Twu, 2010) , we find, on average, a markedly higher proportion of firms either abandoning (8 percent) or decreasing (19 percent) their payout amount by more than 30 percent from last fiscal year in Latin America. We also observe that initiators (almost 9 percent) and marked dividend increasers (27 percent) are also prevalent in Latin America. In contrast, Skinner (2008) shows that in the United States the proportion of firms increasing dividends (by any amount) ranges from 17.9 percent to 11.2 percent in recent decades. The corresponding proportion of firms reducing dividend is at about the 1 percent level (also see Chemmanur, 2010) . Moreover, while the proportion of prior payers who pay is reported internationally as above 95 percent in Twu (2010) , it is on average about 63 percent in Latin America. Hence, this constitutes intriguing evidence of a distinctively high flexibility in payout statuses and amounts in Latin America.
[Please insert table 1 about here.]
Turning to table 2, we report findings in respect to the Lambrecht-Myers theory which can inform interpretation of the Lintner (1956) equation. In line with our dividend flexibility hypothesis, we find that the speed of adjustment and the target payout ratios are substantively higher in Latin America than in the USA. Further, habit formation is substantively lower in Latin America, once outliers are removed at the 5 percent and 95 percent levels. 4 We conjecture that the higher target payout ratios reported in Latin America vis-à-vis North America can stem from the greater importance of signaling to the higher target payout ratio firms. Our main conclusion is that the higher target payout ratios and speed of adjustment, and lower habit formation rates in Latin America, show the relative flexibility of payout policy in Latin America. We leave to future work the identification of an explanation for this result.
[Please insert table 2 about here.]
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the relative flexibility of corporate payout policies of firms listed in seven Latin American countries. Our initial motivation to study the Latin American region is as a result of distinctive dividend ratios in emerging markets (Denis and Osobov, 2008 and Goyal and Muckley, 2013) and the relative riskiness of economic growth variation exhibited by these markets.
Our findings suggest that there is a substantive payout policy flexibility in Latin America. Using the Lambrecht-Myers (2012) theoretical insight into the Lintner (1956) equations, we show that the speed of adjustment and target payout ratios are, indeed, much higher in Latin America than in North America. Moreover, the rate of habit formation, of firm managers in respect to payout policy decisions, is markedly low. We suggest that Latin
American firms may exhibit greater information asymmetries (due to a financial immaturity) which can be somewhat offset by high dividend ratios. We leave to future work, however, the provision of an explanation for the relative flexibility of Latin American pay outs. Table 2 Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator results with robust standard errors
The dependent variable of the regressions is the amount of dividend paid (DIV). LDIV is the lagged value of the amount of dividend paid, NI is net income. P-values are presented below the coefficients within parentheses. SOA is the speed of adjustment and it is calculated as 1 minus the coefficient of LDIV. TPOR is the target payout ratio, calculated as the coefficient of NI divided by the SOA. HF is the habit formation calculated from the change in dividends (for trimmed observations) based on Myers and Lambrecht (2012, equation 47 a) using a risk free interest rate of 0.5% for the USA and 15% for Latin America.
b) based on trimmed observations at 5% and 95%.
